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Evidence acquired inside the mono-disciplinary matrices of neurobiology, clinical psychology and psychopathology is deeply insufficient in terms of their validity, reliability and specificity, and can not reveal the explanatory mechanisms underlying mental disorders. Moreover no effective trans-disciplinary connections have been developed between them. In epistemological perspective current diagnostic tool are different but overlapping instruments exploring the same phenomenology. In line with the more scientific re-definition of mental disorders we defend the view that this process should take place under intensive (not extensive) dialogue with neuroscience. As Kato suggested only neurobiological studies using modern technology could form the basis for a new classification.This is to say that categorical approach in diagnosis should be abandoned in favor of broader diagnostic constructs (such as dimensional and prototype units) which are endorsed or "flanked" with data from neuroscience. Those broader units should be a subject of comprehensive evaluation of the personal narrative in context.


1. Epistemological foundations. Mind-brain translation


Many terms like “emotions” are frequently employed in many disciplinary systems, such as psychology, psychopathology, and neurosciences. Therefore “emotions” is a shared construct with all derivative terms which are used to describe human experiences in health and disease, e.g. “depression” or “anger”, “grief” and so forth.  There are established vertical (bottom-up and top-down; reductive vs. emergent) connections in order to sustain biological explanations.
My intuition is that there exists another kind of important horizontal structures in mental health knowledge which require consistent translation. We can define and understand the realm of mentality of its own right but any cognitive structure in it (regularity or notion representing certain aspects of consciousness) has to be underpinned with correspondent cognitive structure in the realm of neural processes, which is demonstrated in the following diagram.


Diagram 1:  Horizontal and vertical mechanisms 					  determining explanations in mental health knowledge


If regarded as bridge psychophysical laws, these lines of explanation must be supported with sufficient evidence to predispose reconciliation between paradigms in mental health and adequate translation between domains of neuroscience and humanities. However I do not embrace Nagel’s demand for ontological elimination of the reduced entities besides the most basic sciences (neuro-biochemistry in our case). As it has been argued in a number of our previous papers a program for ultimate reduction (like those proposed by the eliminative materialism and eiphenomenalism) is predestinated to failure due to a number of meta-empirical reasons.

2. The impact of translation on the debate on psychiatric validity. The Pittsburgh model


Currently each of the disciplinary matrices (sources) concerned with mental health is discrete from the others. This means that neuroscience, clinical psychology and psychopathology employ operational disciplinary language and methods of its own right and has limited if any intelligible sense in the other two fields. In addition there is plethora of paradigm controversies which precludes the inter-disciplinary communication.

If we decide to focus for example on the case with the clinical assessment then a careful examination of the current methods reveals that a clinical psychiatric interview and a clinical psychological rating scale consist of same kind of cognitive content. Nonetheless both psychiatrists and clinical psychologists claim that their tools (sources of information) are liable to mutual cross-validation. 
Psychological tests (e.g. MMPI, Neo-FFI) are composed of self-evaluation reports (items) formulated as questions or statements. Psychopathological structured interview (e.g. PANSS, MADRS, DSM-IV structured interview) are typically formulated in the terms of subjective experience indicated as symptoms (actually these are self reports recorded by the physician) complemented with the so called ‘signs’ or the presumably ‘objective’ observations of the overt behavior of the patient. 
The vast majority of the psychological assessment tools are standardized according to entirely “atheoretic” empirical procedure. In other words the items have been selected and keyed on the basis of their ability to distinguish diagnostic groups. The basis for the presumed “independent” assessment is actually the clinical judgment of the psychiatrist.
The current diagnostic hypothesis is raised and developed under the dominant psychiatric standard and is then is supplemented with the clinical psychological results. It is assumed that the psychological inventories are validated back to the psychopathological constructs and forward to the psychosocial outcome of the treatment.
Insofar none of the compounds of the structured psychopathological interview and the clinical psychological rating scales is independent to the inter-subjective patient and professional narratives. Both kinds of dimensions (psychiatric and psychological) lay inside the domain of value-in subjective assessment of human psychology, namely the narrative. 
Therefore repeated protocols from various clinicians which serve to sustain the reliability claim of the ‘scientific’ DSM can not be regarded as independent measurement for the cognitive content and the value of the psychological rating scales or vica versa. Furthermore this undermines the potential to explain the mechanisms of production of mental disorders.
This is why they can not be credited as truly ‘external’ and ‘independent’ validity operations. We assert therefore that only value-free facts from neurobiological research can play this role. 
At the same time the inter-disciplinary structure of psychiatry involves many facets from neuroscience which might regarded as one possible source of external validity as well as of explanation. Neuroscience shares many categories with psychopathology as mentioned above. However there are not introduced any relevant rules for "translation" of the data among these inter-connected domains of common interest.
Instead in conventional context, expert committees have combined phenomenological criteria in variable ways into categories of mental disorders, repeatedly defined and redefined over the last half century. The diagnostic categories are termed “disorders” and yet, despite not being validated by biological criteria as most medical diseases are, are framed as medical diseases identified by medical diagnoses without any shared explanation of the mechanisms which produce them.
The more scientific re-definition of mental disorders requires intensive dialogue with neuroscience to reveal the connections with the person- and values-based understanding. One possible approach to achieve this goal would be to abandon the categorical taxonomy in favor of broader diagnostic constructs (such as dimensional and prototype units) which are endorsed or “flanked” with data from neuroscience. Those broader units should be a subject of comprehensive evaluation of the personal narrative in context.

The epistemic tool of this dialogue in my perspective should be the translational cross-validation, represented in the Pitt model bellow​[1]​.

The figure bellow represents the trans-disciplinary nomothetic network of clinical psychology, psychiatry and neuroscience. They are regarded as three interconnected disciplinary matrixes, stabilized with cross-validity “bridging” structures. Each box illustrates a provisional common used term, where “A” stands for paranoia and “B” – for depression. The blue arrows indicate the bridges of convergent inter- and trans-disciplinary validity; the red arrows indicate divergent (discriminative) inter-disciplinary validity and the green arrows - discriminative trans-disciplinary validity.

Experimentally this model entails simultaneous administration of clinical assessment tools with neurobiological measures. Its end-point implications are as follows:
(i)	Replacement of the neutral (or inert) visual picture stimuli in current neuroimaging designs, since those can serve namely and only as neutral in terms of diagnosis emotional stimuli. This is to say that such kind of stimuli have no diagnostic value and hence can not relate or be embodied into validity operations and have no capacity to integrate explanatory mechanisms. To overcome this issue we suggest that the brain imaging should involve real-time rating with disorder-relevant scales (such as MMPI) performed simultaneously with fMRI. 
(ii)	Implement this approach to mental states and dynamic mental disorders e.g. bipolar depression;




The basic claim of this paradigm is that the different sources (or disciplinary matrixes) of explanation should be enabled to converge toward an overlap of the neurobiological mechanisms underlying mental disorder and the narrative (s) of the patient in real time. Eventually such approach can facilitate the inter-domain translation of the shared terms in psychopathology, clinical psychology and neuroscience.
The introduction of such model has several consequences:
	It sustains the validity of the trans-disciplinary nomothetic network, which should exist to connect psychiatry, psychology and neuroscience 
	Hence it sets a prerequisite for inter-domain translation
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^1	  Known also as SMS paradigm, the latter has been coined most recently by C. Robert Cloninger from the names of its authors: Stoyanov, Machamer and Schaffner.
